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MACEY RESPONDS TO LUBET
Jonathan R. Maceyt
After a time, I suppose, academic writers become accustomed
to having certain aspects of their work misconstrued. This has happened to me on occasion, sometimes as a result of what I believe to
be a misunderstanding by a particular reader, but sometimes, I must
concede, as a result of my own lack of clarity.
Thus I was not surprised to find that Steven Lubet, a clinician at
Northwestern Law School, has misread my review' of Allan Bloom's
book, The Closing of the American Mind.2 What is both amusing and
disconcerting about Mr. Lubet's rather petulant reaction to my
Book Review is that he accuses me of precisely the intolerance
against which I was inveighing in my Review. In other words, he
interprets my plea for tolerance as an example of intolerance. How
depressing.
The point of my Book Review was quite simple. It seemed to
me then, as it does now, that Professor Bloom's perspective on
American education is troubling because it is likely to result in a
dangerous intolerance of academic diversity. I was making the basic
point that one can have high academic standards without succumbing to Bloom's rigid, absolutist philosophical perspective.
Peering through a highly defensive lens, Mr. Lubet takes my
remarks to be an attack on his domain-the world of clinical legal
education. He appears to believe that I think that clinical education
has no place in a top flight law school curriculum. This is not what I
believe. I enthusiastically support clinical education. As I said in
my Review, however, I think it is important that law school faculties
think carefully about "such things as how much to emphasize skills
courses and how much to emphasize traditional education and how
much to emphasize non-traditional subjects like finance and philosophy." 3 Thus, Mr. Lubet really is misreading me when he claims
that I think the issue of whether clinical education has a role in a law
school curriculum is in doubt.
He is right, of course, that I singled out clinical education as a
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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source of concern. But my concern about clinical education is not
that it is not a worthwhile endeavor, but that law schools appear
unwilling to devote the resources necessary to monitor and control
what takes place in the clinical setting. In my view, the problem of
monitoring is greater in the clinic than in the classroom because it is
far more difficult to evaluate the experience that students have in a
clinical setting than it is to evaluate the experience that students receive in the classroom. Generally speaking, each student's clinical
experience is unique and individual. Some students will be placed
in an intellectually challenging and rewarding environment. Others
will not. In addition, it is tempting for law school faculties to ignore
the clinical component of the curriculum, particularly since law students rarely complain about undemanding courses.
Aside from monitoring, a second problem with clinical education is that the scope of students' clinical caseloads often is determined by political considerations. Local bar associations understandably are concerned about the prospect of law students offering
free legal advice through legal clinics to their potential paying clients. And law schools are just as understandably concerned that a
clinic with too broad a focus will alienate the local bar. Consequently, political considerations often dictate the substantive con4
tent of the clinical curriculum.
My point here, and in my Book Review, is not that clinical
teaching should be removed from the law school curriculum, but
that it should be treated seriously, rather than ignored. Mr. Lubet
reacted to my Review like a bureaucrat being threatened with deregulation. The vehemence and defensiveness of his response is curious. He himself admits that it is at least possible that "certain
clinical courses are poorly taught, or that certain teachers demand
less than rigorous analysis from their students."'5 If he is willing to
admit this, then it seems to me that we are in agreement about the
need for implementing standards in this, as in other aspects of the
curriculum.
As I said in my Review, the fact that law schools are part of
university communities means that they have "the responsibility to
distinguish, on the basis of quality . . . among the multitudinous
voices that attempt to lay claim to the ears of our students." 6
Clinical education is one such voice.
Along these lines, Mr. Lubet claims that it is paternalistic of me
4
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problems as clinical courses, they are not as popular as clinical courses.
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to suggest that law faculties should have a role in maintaining curricular quality. 7 After all, he argues, if markets really work, then it is
the students who take worthless courses who will be disadvantaged
by the existence of such courses. But this ignores the fact that part
of what law schools are "selling" to students is their relative advantage in evaluating curricular issues. In addition, this ignores the externalities of the law student's choice: if the law school turns out
inferior graduates, all students suffer as the school's reputation declines. Both these factors argue in favor of greater faculty involvement in monitoring student choices.
Law schools have better information about the sorts of things
that students should study before becoming lawyers. One of the
things that law schools "sell" to their students is information about
what one ought to do on the way to becoming a member of the legal
profession. To say that law schools have a responsibility to provide
guidance and directions to students in this regard is no more paternalistic than is the provision of medical advice by doctors to their
patients.
To me the most interesting question raised by Mr. Lubet's
twelve page comment on my eight page Book Review is why he
found my Review so troubling. I think the answer lies in the fact
that the place of clinical education in law school curricula is considered by many to be somewhat precarious. Perhaps if clinicians like
Mr. Lubet were a bit less defensive the situation would improve.
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